412i, 419e plans litigation and IRS Audit Experts for abusive insurance based plans deemed reportable or listed transactions by the IRS
412i, 419e plans litigation and IRS Audit Experts for abusive insurance based plans deemed reportable or listed transactions by the IRS
Lance Wallachon would pay the premium on the policy and take a deduction for the entire amount. In year 5, when the policy had little or no cash value, the plan would transfer the policy to the individual, who would take it at a greatly reduced basis. Subsequently, the policy would bloom like a rose, and the individual would have a policy with significant cash value which he or she could withdraw tax free.
ReplyDeleteWho signed off on the plan?
Attorney Richard Smith at the law firm of Bryan Cave issued tax opinion letters opinion which stated that many of the plans complied with the tax code.
So what is the problem?
In the early 2000s, IRS officials began questioning Richard Smith and others and giving speeches at benefits conferences wherein they took the position that these plans were in violation of both the letter and spirit of the Internal Revenue Code.
In February 2004, the IRS issued guidance on 412(i) and began the process of making plans "listed transactions." Taxpayers involved in listed transaction are required to report them to the IRS. These transactions are to be reported using a form 8886. The failure to file a form 8886 subjects individual to penalties of $100,000 per year, and corporations $200,000 per year. These penalties are often referred to as section 6707 penalties. Advisors of these plans are required to maintain records regarding these plans and turn them over to the IRS, upon demand.
In October of 2005, the IRS invited those who sponsored 412(i) plans that were treated as listed transactions to enter a settlement program in which the taxpayer would recind the plan and pay the income taxes it would have paid had it not engaged in the plan, plus interest and reduced penalties.In late 2005, the IRS began obtaining information from advisors and actively auditing plans and more recently, levying section 6707 penalties.
Class Action Challenges Propriety of 412(e)(3) Annuities for ERISA Defined Benefit Plans
ReplyDeleteviders, the Fidelity Life class action could be the first among many filed against the insurance industry.
Second, this lawsuit continues the unrelenting efforts by the ERISA class action plaintiffs’ bar to try to transform insurance companies – mere sellers of retirement products and services – into ERISA fiduciaries. We first observed these efforts in earnest in the revenue-sharing class actions we have defended, and this case appears to continue the trend in which plaintiffs attempt to recast ministerial tasks or sales efforts as fiduciary conduct. The rulings in this case could contribute to the developing body of law regarding what activities can cause entities to qualify as ERISA fiduciaries.
Third, this lawsuit could trigger other non-412(e)(3) lawsuits claiming that other life insurance or annuity-based retirement products and services are “too expensive” or “unsuitable” for retirement plans. We have already observed these same sort of efforts in the ERISA stock drop cases we have defended, in which plaintiffs contend that company stock was unsuitable, and more recently, in some of the plan sponsor revenue-sharing cases, in which plaintiffs contend that certain mutual fund offerings used as investment options are too expensive. This lawsuit could cause the ERISA class action plaintiffs’ bar to look for other types of products for which it could pursue similar claims.
Class Action Challenges Propriety of 412(e)(3) Annuities for ERISA Defined Benefit Plans
ReplyDeleteviders, the Fidelity Life class action could be the first among many filed against the insurance industry.
Second, this lawsuit continues the unrelenting efforts by the ERISA class action plaintiffs’ bar to try to transform insurance companies – mere sellers of retirement products and services – into ERISA fiduciaries. We first observed these efforts in earnest in the revenue-sharing class actions we have defended, and this case appears to continue the trend in which plaintiffs attempt to recast ministerial tasks or sales efforts as fiduciary conduct. The rulings in this case could contribute to the developing body of law regarding what activities can cause entities to qualify as ERISA fiduciaries.
Third, this lawsuit could trigger other non-412(e)(3) lawsuits claiming that other life insurance or annuity-based retirement products and services are “too expensive” or “unsuitable” for retirement plans. We have already observed these same sort of efforts in the ERISA stock drop cases we have defended, in which plaintiffs contend that company stock was unsuitable, and more recently, in some of the plan sponsor revenue-sharing cases, in which plaintiffs contend that certain mutual fund offerings used as investment options are too expensive. This lawsuit could cause the ERISA class action plaintiffs’ bar to look for other types of products for which it could pursue similar claims.